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I
n modern corporations, ownership is typically separate from control.
Holderness et al. (1999) ﬁnd that executives and directors, as a group,
owned an average of only 21 percent of the stock in corporations they ran
in 1995. Typically, employees in lower levels of the hierarchy do not have
any ownership. Moreover, employees are motivated by self-interest and not
necessarily by the interest of the owners. Therefore, incentive problems arise
in most corporations. The ﬁnanciers cannot assure that employees will not
expropriate funds or waste them on unattractive projects. (For a discussion of
these corporate governance issues, see Shleifer andVishny [1997] and Wein-
berg [2003].)The ﬂows of enormous amounts of capital to ﬁrms indicate that,
at least in most advanced market economies, the problems of corporate gov-
ernance have been solved reasonably well. However, problems still arise, as
illustrated by the scandals caused by the misreporting of corporate earnings;
Shleifer andVishny (1997) discuss evidence of managerial behavior that does
not serve the interest of investors.
In this article, we study how an employee is disciplined by career con-
cerns. Fama (1980) suggests that employees are disciplined by the opportuni-
ties provided by the labor market for their services, both within and outside
theﬁrm.Thisisthecasewhenthemarketdoesnotknowtheemployee’sfuture
productivity and learns about it by observing his performance. In general, the
employer has to pay more to the employee when the employee is believed to
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be more productive; otherwise another ﬁrm in the market would offer more to
him. Thus,theemployee’scompensationdependsonthelabormarket’sbelief
about his future productivity. Therefore, when the employee decides his ac-
tions, he cares about his performance (and, consequently, the performance of
the ﬁrm) because his performance inﬂuences his reputation—i.e., the beliefs
about the employee’s future productivity.
Consider a salesperson who knows that if the labor market believes that
he has high ability (for example, he has a good sales strategy and knowledge
of the market), he will more likely be offered a position as a sales manager.
The salesperson’s sales depends both on his ability and the number of hours
worked. Because the market cannot directly observe the hours worked, it does
not know if an increase in sales is the result of more hours or greater ability.
However, we assume that the market believes that the salesperson works the
typical number of hours (we require that the market expectation is conﬁrmed
in equilibrium) and interprets the amount sold as a signal of his ability. For
example, supposethatthemarketbelievesthatthesalespersonworks40hours
per week. Also, suppose the market observes that the salesperson sells 100
unitsperweek.Then,themarketconsidersthesalesperson’sabilitytobethatof
someone who sells 100 units in 40 hours. In this situation, the salesperson has
incentives to work more hours in order to sell more, to appear more talented,
and consequently, to increase the probability of being offered a better job.
A complementary approach to the study of career concerns is one that
looks at how to pay employees in order to motivate them to act in the best
interest of the employer. Surveys of the literature on optimal contracts can be
found in Rosen (1992) and Murphy (1999).1 In this case, the salesperson’s
employercouldofferacontractthatcommitstopaymorewhenthesalesperson
sellsmore.Suchacontractalsowouldprovideincentivestoworklongerhours.
Compensation contracts are not discussed in this article.2
Incentives derived from career concerns are not only important for the top
executives of a ﬁrm, but also for other employees. Moreover, career-concern
incentives matter in many lines of work. For example, an assistant professor
writes papers for publication in part because the decision regarding his tenure
andfuturesalarydependsonthebeliefsabouthisfutureproductivity, whichis
determined by his past production. Another example involves athletes. Stiroh
1 For a discussion of other mechanisms that discipline employees’ behavior, see Shleifer and
Vishny (1997).
2 In many jobs, compensation contracts are not observed. Moreover, understanding career-
concern incentives is also a step toward the study of compensation contracts that complement
these incentives. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) study optimal contracts in a framework with career
concerns and ﬁnd that employers would choose to provide stronger incentives through contracts
when career-concern incentives are weaker (later in the employee’s career). They also present
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(2003) and Wilczynski (2004) present empirical evidence of the presence of
career concerns for basketball players.
There is a large literature on the effects of career concerns on policymak-
ers’decisions. We can think about policymakers as voters’employees. Voters
learn about a policymaker’s ability through his performance. Their decision
to reelect him depends on the expectations about the policymaker’s future
performance (determined by the policymaker’s past performance).3 Poli-
cymakers want to be reelected, and therefore, consider how their decisions
affect their performance.4
Following Holmstrom’s (1999) seminal work, we present career-concern
incentives in a simple model in which the employee decides how much effort
to exert on the job.5 The labor market does not know the employee’s exact
productiveability,andhisabilityisinferredfromhisoutput. Effortcanneither
beobservednorperfectlyinferredfromtheoutputproducedbytheemployee—
there is no one-to-one relationship between effort and output. Thus, after
observing output, the market still does not know the effort level exerted by
the employee. Even though it is costly for the employee to exert effort, he
does so because his future compensation depends on his performance. By
exerting more effort, the employee produces more, and therefore, makes the
market believe that he has more ability. When the market perceives that the
employeehasmoreability,itassignsahighercompensation. Weshowthatthe
employee exerts more effort when his future compensation is more sensitive
to his reputation, and when he believes it is more likely that he can affect his
compensation with his effort level.
To what extent do career-concern incentives eliminate the inefﬁciencies
originated by the separation of ownership and control? Does the employee
work as hard as he would if he owned the ﬁrm? In the model examined in
this article, the effort the employee would exert if he owned the ﬁrm is the
sociallyefﬁcienteffortlevel. Thisistheeffortlevelabenevolentsocialplanner
wouldchooseifhecouldobservetheeffortexertedbytheemployee. Itcanbe
deﬁned as the effort level at which the social marginal cost of exerting effort
3 Empirical studies on economic voting show that voting behavior depends on economic per-
formance (for a review, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). For example, Brender (2003) ﬁnds
that “the incremental student success rate during the mayor’s term had a signiﬁcant positive effect
on his reelection chances.”
4 Barro (1973) starts the literature on political agency discussed by Persson and Tabellini
(2000) and Besley (2005). Besley and Case (1995) and Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001) present
empirical evidence supporting this theory. There are many applications of political agency models
of career concerns. Besley and Case (1995) study the more typical effort-choice decisions. Persson
and Tabellini (2000) present models of rent-seeking. Shi and Svensson (2002) study the cyclical
manipulation of ﬁscal policy. Eggertsson and Le Borgne (2005) study the effects of career concerns
for monetary policy.
5 Discussions on the effect of career concerns on investment decisions are presented by Holm-
strom (1999), Prendergast and Stole (1996), and Dasgupta and Prat (2005). Ahmad and Martinez
(2005) study how career concerns may discipline recipients in donor-recipient relationships.82 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
equals the social marginal beneﬁt of exerting effort. From a social standpoint,
is the employee working too hard or should he be working harder? In the
simple model we present, the social cost of effort is given by the employee’s
cost. On the other hand, the social beneﬁt of effort is given by the value
of the output produced by the employee with his effort (this would be the
employee’s beneﬁt if he owned the ﬁrm). In general, the social beneﬁt does
not coincide with the employee’s private beneﬁt of exerting effort, given by
the expected increase in his future compensation. Consequently, there is no
reason to expect that the employee would exert the efﬁcient effort level. In
general, we cannot expect that career-concern incentives will eliminate the
inefﬁcienciesoriginatedbytheseparationofownershipandcontrol. Similarly,
we cannot expect an employee’s decisions to be socially efﬁcient because of
career concerns.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 1, we
present a simple model of career concerns. In Section 2, we study the equi-
librium effort decision for this model. In Section 3, we conclude.
1. A SIMPLE MODEL OF CAREER CONCERNS
We study a one-period version of the main model in Holmstrom’s (1999)
seminal article, but, following Martinez (2005a), we consider a discontinuous
compensation scheme, which is reasonable and will allow us to show that
the employee may work too hard in the simple framework presented in this
article. Thus, we present a game played by the employee and the market for
his services.
The Environment
At the beginning of the game, both the market and the employee are ignorant
of the employee’s ability. An employee may be ignorant of his ability when
met with new tasks. Further, this assumption represents situations where an
employee’s success does not only depend on his individual ability but also
on the ability of others working with him.6 The employee and the market
both share the same beliefs about the employee’s ability. These beliefs are
given by a probability distribution with a differentiable cumulative density
function, F.
6As explained below, the assumption that the employee does not know his ability implies
that the effort exerted by the employee is the effort expected by the employer. This assumption
simpliﬁes the exposition of the employer’s learning, and, in the simple model presented in this
article, implies that the employer learns the employee’s ability after observing output.A. Foerster and L. Martinez: Career Concerns 83
First,theemployeedecidestheeffortheexertsonthejob,a ≥ 0.7 Theem-
ployee produces output, y. Output is a function of the employee’s productive
ability, η, and his effort. In particular,
y = a + η. (1)
Aftertheemployeechooseshiseffort,ηisrealized.Thatis,whentheemployee
decides his effort, he does not know exactly how much he will produce, but
he knows that with increased effort he will produce more.
We do not consider the employee’s current-period compensation because
it has already been determined and does not affect the employee’s decision
problem.8 The employee exerts effort in order to inﬂuence his future com-
pensation (for a multi-period version of this model, see Holmstrom [1999] or
Martinez [2005a]). At the end of the game, the employee’s future compensa-
tion, w, is determined (see discussion below).
There is a cost to exerting effort, c(a), with c  (a) ≥ 0, c   (a) > 0,
and c  (0) = 0. With w, the employee buys w units of output for his own
consumption. We assume that the employee’s utility is linear in consumption.
In particular, if the employee consumes w, we assume that his utility equals
u(w,a) = w − c(a). (2)
Players (the employee and the market) observe y, while η is not directly
observed. The market does not observe the employee’s exact effort, while the
employee does.9
The Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium effort is given by a∗ if when the market believes that the em-
ployee chooses a∗, it is optimal for him to do so. When the market determines
the employee’s compensation, it does not know the employee’s effort level.
Thus, the market’s belief about the exerted effort needs to be deﬁned. We
assume that the market believes that the employee chooses the equilibrium
effort.
Equilibrium Learning
As explained above, in equilibrium, the market assigns probability one to
the employee exerting the equilibrium effort. The market is rational and
7 We assume that the employee plays a pure strategy.
8 Recall that we assume that there are no compensation contracts, and incentives come only
from career concerns. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) present a model with both compensation con-
tracts and career concerns.
9Alternatively, in agency models of career concern, we assume that the agent’s action is
observable but the principal is uninformed (see, for example, Shi’s and Svensson’s [2002] political
budget cycle model).84 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
understands the game. In particular, it can infer the employee’s equilibrium
strategy, a∗. Loosely speaking, the market knows how hard an employee with
certain characteristics works in certain situations.
Observing y allows the market to learn η by using its knowledge about
the effort exerted by the employee, a∗, and the production function. Thus, the
ability inferred by the market is given by
ηm ≡ y − a∗ = η + a − a∗. (3)
The employee can manipulate the ability inferred by the market with his
effort decision. In particular, if the employee exerts more effort, the market
believes that he has more ability: ηm is increasing with respect to a. Conse-
quently, if the employee’s compensation is higher when the market believes
he has more productive ability, the employee has career-concern incentives to
exert effort.
On the equilibrium path, the effort expected by the market is the effort
exerted by the employee, and therefore, the ability inferred by the market is
equal to the true ability. The inference of the market is wrong, however, when
the employee deviates from equilibrium behavior.
The Compensation Scheme
In models of career concerns, the employee’s compensation depends on the
market’s belief about his future productivity.10 As illustrated in equation (1),
the employee’s productivity depends on his ability and on the effort he ex-
erts. Martinez (2005a) shows that, in general, the market’s belief about the
employee’s ability is sufﬁcient for determining the effort it expects the em-
ployee to exert (the equilibrium effort). Consequently, its belief about the
employee’s ability is sufﬁcient for determining its belief about his future pro-
ductivity, and therefore, for determining his compensation. Thus, we assume
that compensation is a function of the ability inferred by the market.
Furthermore, following Martinez (2005a), we consider a discontinuous
compensation scheme. That is, we assume that a small change in the em-
ployee’s reputation may imply a large change in his compensation. In partic-







wH,i fηm ≥ ηG
wL, otherwise, (4)
10 The exact relationship between the market’s belief about the employee’s future productivity
and compensation depends on the labor market structure considered (see MacDonald 1982, Bern-
hardt 1995; Gibbons and Waldman 1999; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Prescott 2003). The analysis
of this relationship is beyond the scope of this article. We focus on the incentives generated when
the agent’s compensation depends on his future productivity.A. Foerster and L. Martinez: Career Concerns 85
where wH >w L.11 This compensation scheme may be interpreted as the
employee being assigned to a high-compensation occupation if his reputation
is good enough, and to a low-compensation occupation otherwise.12 For
example, suppose that there are two tasks. One task has a low return, wL > 0.
The other task has a high return, wH, if assigned to a high-ability employee,
η ≥ ηG, and a negative return if assigned to a low-ability employee, η<η G.
With this technology, the employee would be assigned to the high-return task
if and only if ηm ≥ ηG.13
2. THE EQUILIBRIUM EFFORT DECISION
At the beginning of the game, the employee’s expected utility is given by





where P [x] denotes the probability of x.
Recall that ηm ≥ ηG if and only if η ≥ ηG − a + a∗. Thus, by exerting a
higher effort, the employee decreases the minimum realization of ability that
would allow him to enjoy the high compensation. The employee’s maximiza-













We shall proceed by characterizing the employee’s equilibrium effort de-
cision through the ﬁrst-order condition of his problem.14 Let ˆ a (a∗) denote
11 The results presented here do not change much if wH and wL depend on the employee’s
reputation. The assumption that wH and wL do not depend on reputation simpliﬁes the analysis
and allows us to focus on the incentives generated by a discontinuity in the compensation scheme.
12 Employees’ abilities may be occupation-speciﬁc. However, as long as there is a positive
correlation between employees’ abilities in different occupations, employees with better performance
in one occupation are more likely to perform well in other occupations. We can interpret the model
presented in this article as one in which the employee tries to manipulate the signal that is relevant
in order to be assigned to the high-compensation occupation.
13 Discontinuous compensation schemes are widely observed in various occupations. First,
as documented by the empirical literature, the employee may be assigned to different levels in a
hierarchy according to his reputation, and these reassignments often imply a discontinuous change
in the employee’s compensation (see Murphy 1985; Kwon 2005). The span-of-control literature
presents theories of why employees with higher ability are assigned to higher levels in hierar-
chies (see Prescott 2003). There is a theoretical literature explaining why a ﬁrm would choose
this compensation structure (see Bernhardt 1995). Furthermore, capacity constraints imply that the
employer replaces the incumbent employee when the employer expects to be better off with the
replacement. In general, the employee is not indifferent about losing his position.
14 The ﬁrst term in problem (5) may not be globally concave. Thus, the employee’s max-
imization problem may not be globally concave. However, we can assure the global concavity
of the employee’s problem by assuming that the cost of exerting effort is convex enough. For
example, one could ﬁnd an upper bound for the slope of the marginal beneﬁt curve and assume
that the slope of the marginal cost curve is always higher. Another alternative is to assume that
c(a) = an, and n is high enough. Consequently, the marginal cost is very low for a low a and,
for a high enough a, it starts increasing rapidly, assuring that the marginal cost curve crosses the
marginal beneﬁt curve only once (from below) and, therefore, the problem is globally concave (see
Martinez 2005b).86 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the employee’s optimal effort choice when the market expects the employee
to choose a∗. Let f denote the density function corresponding to F. The












In order to ﬁnd the equilibrium effort, we have to solve a ﬁxed-point
problem. We need to ﬁnd an a∗ such that when the market expects a∗,i ti s
optimal for the employee to choose a∗. In equilibrium, the effort expected by
the market has to be equal to the effort the employee chooses to exert given
the market’s expectations. That is, a∗ is the equilibrium effort exerted by the
employee if and only if ˆ a (a∗) = a∗.
Assumingthatproblem(5)isstrictlyconcaveassuresthatforagiveneffort
expected by the market, a∗, there exists a unique optimal effort level, ˆ a (a∗),
given by the ﬁrst-order condition in equation (6). This does not mean that the
equilibrium effort, a∗, exists and is unique. There could be more than one a∗
such that when the market expects a∗, the employee’s optimal effort level is
given by a∗, that is, there could be more than one a∗ such that ˆ a (a∗) = a∗.I t
could also be that there is no equilibrium effort level, a∗, such that when the
market expects a∗, it is optimal for the employee to choose a∗.
In our framework, a unique equilibrium effort exists.15 In order to ﬁnd
the equilibrium effort, the ﬁxed-point condition, ˆ a (a∗) = a∗, is imposed in









The right-hand side of equation (7) is positive. The marginal cost of exerting
effortisstrictlyincreasing,andc  (0) = 0. Consequently,thereexistsaunique
equilibrium effort, a∗ > 0, satisfying equation (7). The intuition behind
uniqueness is clear. The effort expected by the market affects the marginal
beneﬁt of exerting effort through the ability inferred by the market, ηm.I n
equilibrium,theeffortexertedbytheemployeeisthatwhichisexpectedbythe
market, and therefore, ηm = η, which does not depend on that effort. Thus,
equilibrium effort does not depend on the effort expected by the market.
Discussion
In this section, we discuss the results presented above through a simple exam-
ple. Let us consider a salesperson who sells products from store to store. The
15 Martinez (2004) discusses a ﬁring model of career concerns in which the convexity of
the agent’s problem implies that the agent’s equilibrium strategy does not exist even though an
optimal effort level exists for each effort expected by the principal. He also shows that, in a more
general framework, if the agent’s problem is strictly concave, the agent’s equilibrium action exists
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marketmaynotbeabletoobservehowmanyhoursthesalespersonisworking,
butitknowshowmanyasalespersontypicallyworks. Weassumethatthemar-
ket believes that the salesperson works the typical number of hours. Suppose
that the market believes the salesperson works 40 hours per week (a∗ = 40)
and observes that the salesperson sells 100 units per week (y = 100). Based
on this information, the market considers that the salesperson’s ability is that
of someone who sells 100 units in 40 hours.
We show that in our framework, a unique equilibrium effort exists, as
deﬁned by equation (7). For any number of hours that the market expects the
salesperson to work, a∗, it is optimal for the salesperson to work ˆ a (a∗) hours.
We require that in an equilibrium, ˆ a (a∗) = a∗. In general, it may be that such
an equilibrium does not exist. It may also be that multiple equilibria exist.
For example, if the salesperson is expected to work 50 hours per week, it is
optimalforhimtodoso. Ontheotherhand, ifheisexpectedtowork40hours
per week, it is optimal for him to do that.
The right-hand side of equation (7) represents the salesperson’s bene-
ﬁt from working an extra hour. This beneﬁt is given by the change in the





, multiplied by the gain from receiving the high compensation,
wH −wL. Asintuitionsuggests,themodelpredictsthatthesalespersonwould
work more hours because of career concerns when his future compensation is
moresensitivetohisreputation(i.e.,wH −wL ishigher),andwhenhebelieves





is higher).16 Holmstrom (1999) shows that we can expect the
employee to exert less effort later in his career. Martinez (2005a) shows that
the relationship between the employee’s decisions and his current reputation
istypicallynonmonotonic; equilibriumeffortishump-shapedoverreputation.
Furthermore, Martinez (2005b) shows that there is a renegotiation cycle—if
theemployee’scompensationisdecidedinfrequently,hewouldtypicallyexert
more effort (for the same reputation level) closer to the compensation period.
Recall that the uncertainty about the salesperson’s ability is crucial for
the existence of career-concern incentives. For example, suppose that in our





is determined at the beginning of the game,
and the salesperson knows that his compensation does not depend on sales.17
16 In a multi-period version of the model, the employee considers that exerting effort affects
the probability of receiving wH in every future period. In this situation, the employee makes
an intertemporal decision as well. In order to affect his future compensation, the employee could
decide to exert more effort in the current period or in the future. The employee compares the
cost and the effectiveness of exerting effort in each period (see Martinez 2005a, 2005b).
17 In general, in models of career concerns, the employee’s compensation depends on the
market’s belief about his future productivity. Therefore, compensation depends on output only
because output affects the market’s inference about the employee’s future productivity.88 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Thus, the salesperson works the minimum number of hours. (Recall that in
our model there are no output-contingent compensation contracts.)
Similarly, in a multi-period version of the simple model we present in this
article, the salesperson would only work more than the minimum number of
hours in the ﬁrst period. In this environment, the market completely learns
the salesperson’s productive ability after one observation of sales. When the
market knows his ability, the salesperson has no career-concern incentives to
work more than the minimum number of hours. This is not the case when
sales are a stochastic function of hours and ability, and therefore, ability is not
completely learned after one observation (see Holmstrom 1999). The units
sold may not only depend on the salesperson’s effort and ability but also,
for example, on his luck in ﬁnding customers who are more likely to buy.
Furthermore, if his ability varies over time, the salesperson would work more
than the minimum number of hours every period (see Holmstrom 1999). For
example, the products the salesperson offers or the type of customers he faces
may change over time, and his ability may depend on each of these factors.
Efﬁciency
Does the employee choose to work too hard or should he choose to work
harder? More speciﬁcally, is the effort decided by the employee higher or
lower than the efﬁcient effort level? Would the employee exert a higher or
a lower effort if he owned the ﬁrm? The socially efﬁcient effort level can be
deﬁned as the level at which the social marginal cost of exerting effort equals
the social marginal beneﬁt of exerting effort. In our model, this is the effort
level a social planner would ask the employee to exert if the planner could
observe the exerted effort. The social cost of effort is given by the employee’s
cost. On the other hand, the social beneﬁt of effort is given by the value of
the output produced by the employee through his effort. The value of the
output is also the beneﬁt the employee would consider if he owned the ﬁrm.
Consequently,thesociallyefﬁcienteffortlevelisalsothatwhichtheemployee
would exert if he owned the ﬁrm.
The linear production function in equation (1) implies that with an ex-
tra unit of effort, the employee produces an extra unit of output. The utility
function in equation (2) implies that the value of an extra unit of output (con-
sumption) is 1. Thus, the efﬁcient effort level, ¯ a,i sg i v e nb yc  (¯ a) = 1.
Ingeneral, theright-handsideofequation(7)isnotequalto1.Thatis, the
social beneﬁt of exerting effort does not coincide with the employee’s private
beneﬁt of exerting effort. Speciﬁcally, the employee will exert the efﬁcient




(wH − wL) = 1. This situation is fairly
restrictive, so there is no reason to expect that the employee would exert the
efﬁcient effort level. Most likely, the employee works too hard or not hard
enough.A. Foerster and L. Martinez: Career Concerns 89






is very sensitive to reputation (i.e., wH − wL is high), the employee works
too hard. On the other hand, if he believes that increasing effort will have





or if the increase in earnings from a better reputation is small (i.e., wH − wL
is low), then he will exert less than the efﬁcient level. We cannot expect an
employee’s decisions to be socially efﬁcient because of career concerns.
3. CONCLUSION
This article presents a simple model of career concerns. An employee with
career concerns wants to establish a reputation for high productivity, as the
labormarket’sexpectationsofhighproductivityallowtheemployeetoreceive
bettercompensation.Thesecareerconcernsdonotnecessarilyleadtosocially
efﬁcient decisions by the employee. For example, if the employee believes
exerting additional effort will drastically increase his chances for better com-
pensation, or if the payoff for having a better reputation is signiﬁcant, then
he will work too hard (from a social efﬁciency standpoint). Alternatively, if
exerting additional effort has a low impact on increasing the probability of
better compensation, and if the increase in compensation from having a better
reputation is low, the employee will not work hard enough. Getting employ-
ees to make socially efﬁcient decisions would require additional incentives
beyond those created by career concerns.
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